Value relevance of multinational directorship and cross-listing on MNEs national governance disclosure practices in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Nigeria

We draw on institutional isomorphism literature to develop a conceptual framework which uncovers how emerging market MNEs manage institutional tensions and complexity in corporate governance (CG) regulations within and across economic environments. Using a sample of 400 firm-year observations (2011–2015) from Nigeria, we show foreign directorship and cross-listing as significant avenues for governance isomorphism. MNEs employ these mechanisms to manage and reconcile foreign and Nigerian CG regulations whilst overcoming institutional weaknesses at home. Specifically, governance isomorphism leads to improvement of home country CG disclosures practices because of associated linkages with international CG systems through cross-listing and employment of multinational directors.     

Persistence of Price–Cost Margin and Technical Efficiency in the Indonesian Food and Beverage Industry

Abstract

This research investigates the persistence of price–cost margin (PCM) and technical efficiency (TE) of firms and the relation between these two factors in 44 subsectors of the Indonesian food and beverage industry in the period 1980–2014. Data envelopment analysis with a bootstrapping approach is applied to estimate TE. An autoregressive model, accounting for endogeneity, is applied to estimate the persistence coefficients of PCM and TE. A cross-sectional regression model is also applied to estimate the relation between the persistence of the PCM and the persistence of TE. The results show that for these food and beverage firms, high PCM and low TE persist. Furthermore, the persistence of PCM negatively affects the persistence of TE in the industry.     

政府研发补贴促进企业创新了吗

政府补贴能否促进企业创新一直存在争议。与以往从资源视角探讨政府补贴与企业创新关系的研究不同，基于信号理论视角，以2012—2016年沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本，通过剔除非研发补贴的噪音并控制样本自选择偏误，实证检验中国转型经济背景下，政府研发补贴对企业创新的微观政策效应，以及企业层面制度因素（产权性质）和区域层面制度因素（制度环境）对该效应的调节作用。研究发现，政府研发补贴释放的积极信号能够帮助企业获取外部创新资源，有效促进企业创新；相比于国有企业，政府研发补贴对非国有企业创新的激励效应更强；制度环境越好，政府研发补贴对企业创新的激励效应越强。研究理论丰富了科技创新政策有效性和信号理论相关研究。同时，研究发现，政府应继续加大对企业创新活动的补贴额度，不断深化所有制改革，为企业创新营造良好的外部制度环境；另外，企业还应充分发挥政府研发补贴信号的杠杆效应，拓宽外部创新资源获取渠道。     

高技术企业多元化战略对创新持续性的影响——动态能力的调节作用

基于资源基础理论和持续创新内生机制，利用435家高技术企业2010—2018年面板数据，对多元化战略对高技术企业创新持续性的影响进行探究。结果表明，产品多元化与创新持续性呈正U型关系，技术多元化对创新持续性具有正向促进作用，产品多元化与技术多元化协同效应对创新持续性具有负向影响；动态能力强化了产品多元化与创新持续性之间的正U型关系，并正向调节技术多元化与创新持续性之间的关系。在动态能力调节作用下，高技术企业产品多元化与技术多元化协同效应对创新持续性具有正向影响。     

纳税信用评级结果披露与研发投入

以纳税信用评级披露作为一个天然外生冲击,并基于2013—2016年1214家A股上市公司的微观数据构造准自然实验,使用双重差分法系统评估纳税信用评级结果披露对上市公司研发投入的影响。结果发现:纳税信用评级结果披露显著增加了上市公司的研发投入。基于PSM-DID方法的估计结果与上述结论无明显差异。稳健性检验也表明上述结论的正确性。机制检验表明,纳税信用评级结果披露通过降低企业的融资约束,进而促进企业增加研发投入。此外,分样本回归发现纳税信用评级结果披露只能对中小型企业和民营企业的研发投入产生促进作用。     

Large agricultural investments in Kenya’s Nanyuki Area: Inventory and analysis of business models

Many experts agree that more agricultural investment is needed in the global South to improve local food security and reduce poverty. However, there is a lack of consensus about the types of investment needed to achieve these goals. This paper contributes to the literature on large agricultural investments and corresponding business models by inventorying and analysing such investments in Kenya’s Nanyuki area. We identify four clusters of business models that differ primarily by type of production and other distinct determinants, namely: demand from markets; access to land; land tenure regime and colonial history; actors involved; biophysical context; labour availability; and governance of the value chain via private standards. The study results shed light on the factors that help or hinder implementation of large agricultural investments and shape their impacts in the context of African land use systems. The way land is accessed represents one of the most-decisive factors determining the risks and opportunities associated with such projects. We find that most investments in the Nanyuki area occur on land bought or leased from private owners.     

Optimal privatization policy with asymmetry among private firms

We revisit the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and market competition indexes such as the Hirschman–Herfindahl index. It is affected by the number of the firms and asymmetry among the sizes of the firms; the smaller the number of firms and the more asymmetry among firms, the higher the market concentration index. The literature on mixed oligopolies suggested that the optimal degree of privatization increases with the number of private firms, and thus, decreases with the market competition index, assuming that all private firms are homogeneous. We investigate how asymmetry among private firms affects the optimal degree of privatization. We propose the simplest and natural model formulation to discuss asymmetry among private firms. We find that the optimal degree of privatization is either nonmonotone or monotonically increasing, and thus never monotonically decreasing, in asymmetry among private firms.     

Will FinTech make regional banks superfluous for small firm finance? Observations from soft information-based lending in Germany

Regional banks have a competitive advantage in that short distances to clients enable the use of soft information for superior lending decisions. If the ambition of FinTech start-ups to create superior screening and monitoring technologies materialises, this advantage would be diminished and regional banks would become superfluous for small firm finance. To explore this claim, the paper in hand analyses qualitative empirical data about the lending processes and rating system use of regional German savings banks. In essence, the results from participant observation and interviews clarify the importance of “real” soft information for critical lending decisions. The context specificity and limited verifiability of “real” soft information hamper it from being hardened through the use of rating systems and other bank-ICT. Though FinTech's scoring technologies may overcome the first limitation, it appears likely that in the course of scoring development “real” soft information will be systematically crowded out due to the manipulation problem. The paper expects improved access to finance for SMEs if FinTech solutions overcome both limitations of “real” soft information use, or if peer-to-peer lending and regional banks coexist. Deteriorated access to finance is expected if FinTech companies displace the relationship banking of regional banks due to enhanced competition, without preserving the advantages of “real” soft information with superior screening and monitoring technologies. The paper concludes with recommendations on how to prevent deteriorated access to finance for small firms by promoting fair competition and FinTech innovations.     

Short-sale constraints and informational efficiency to private information: A natural experiment

Exploiting a regulatory change in short-sale constraints (Regulation SHO) as a natural experiment, this paper examines the effect of short-sale constraints on informational efficiency of stock prices to private information. I find that short-sellers act as informed traders prior to forthcoming analyst news and trade on negative private information. When short-sale constraints are relaxed for pilot stocks (treatment group), both trading volume and stock price sensitivity increase prior to the analyst announcement for bad news but not for good news, relative to that of nonpilot stocks (control group). The findings are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia model that predicts that short-selling increases the speed of adjustment of stock prices to private negative information. In the cross-section, the effect of Reg SHO is stronger in stocks of firms with weak and uncertain information environments (i.e., small firms and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion).     

Politically connected boards,family and business group affiliations,and cost of capital: Evidence from Indonesia

We investigate the effect of politically connected boards (both supervisory boards [SBs] and boards of directors [BODs]) on cost of debt and equity capital of listed companies in Indonesia which has established a two-tier corporate governance system. The results, based on 250 firms, suggest that companies with politically connected SBs experience lower cost of debt and equity capital, whereas politically connected BODs have no association with cost of either debt or equity. Furthermore, we find that family firms and firms belonging to business groups with politically connected SBs enjoy lower cost of debt and equity capital. Our main results are robust to alternative measures and to tests for endogeneity.